Watch Me Improve - Algorithm Aversion and Demonstrating the Ability to Learn by Berger, Benedikt et al.
RESEARCH PAPER
Watch Me Improve—Algorithm Aversion and Demonstrating
the Ability to Learn
Benedikt Berger • Martin Adam • Alexander Rühr • Alexander Benlian
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Abstract Owing to advancements in artificial intelligence
(AI) and specifically in machine learning, information
technology (IT) systems can support humans in an
increasing number of tasks. Yet, previous research indi-
cates that people often prefer human support to support by
an IT system, even if the latter provides superior perfor-
mance – a phenomenon called algorithm aversion. A pos-
sible cause of algorithm aversion put forward in literature
is that users lose trust in IT systems they become familiar
with and perceive to err, for example, making forecasts that
turn out to deviate from the actual value. Therefore, this
paper evaluates the effectiveness of demonstrating an AI-
based system’s ability to learn as a potential countermea-
sure against algorithm aversion in an incentive-compatible
online experiment. The experiment reveals how the nature
of an erring advisor (i.e., human vs. algorithmic), its
familiarity to the user (i.e., unfamiliar vs. familiar), and its
ability to learn (i.e., non-learning vs. learning) influence a
decision maker’s reliance on the advisor’s judgement for
an objective and non-personal decision task. The results
reveal no difference in the reliance on unfamiliar human
and algorithmic advisors, but differences in the reliance on
familiar human and algorithmic advisors that err. Demon-
strating an advisor’s ability to learn, however, offsets the
effect of familiarity. Therefore, this study contributes to an
enhanced understanding of algorithm aversion and is one
of the first to examine how users perceive whether an IT
system is able to learn. The findings provide theoretical and
practical implications for the employment and design of
AI-based systems.
Keywords Algorithm aversion  Artificial intelligence 
Machine learning  Decision support  Advice taking
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) research has extended the
capabilities of information technology (IT) systems to
support or automate tasks, such as medical diagnosis, credit
card fraud detection, and advertising budget allocation
(Anthes 2017). Accordingly, the deployment of AI-based
systems, i.e. IT systems employing capabilities developed
in AI research, is supposed to change substantially how
businesses operate and people work (vom Brocke et al.
2018; Ransbotham et al. 2017). AI researchers employ
various approaches to realize new capabilities, yet many
promising achievements are based on machine learning
(Jordan and Mitchell 2015). Market research companies
predict the market for IT systems employing machine
learning to grow with double-digit rates over the upcoming
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years (Columbus 2020). Regardless of the specific problem
domain, machine learning allows equipping IT systems
with the ability to learn, i.e. the capability to improve in
performance over time (Faraj et al. 2018). Such AI-based
systems can assist users in various situations concerning
their business and private life (Maedche et al. 2019).
A particularly important machine learning use case is
the support of decisions. Decision support systems (DSS)
have evolved in several waves in the past and the appli-
cation of machine learning promises another leap forward
(Watson 2017). Yet, existent decision-making and infor-
mation systems (IS) research suggests that people can be
reluctant to accept support from or delegate decisions to
DSS – a phenomenon called algorithm aversion (Dietvorst
et al. 2015; Castelo et al. 2019).1 This phenomenon con-
stitutes a serious issue for businesses employing DSS:
Since even simple algorithms can outperform humans in
many decision tasks (Kuncel et al. 2013; Elkins et al.
2013), rejecting the advice of DSS often leads to inferior
decisions. Furthermore, potential gains of combining
human and algorithmic insights (Dellermann et al. 2019)
cannot be realized if decision makers are unwilling to take
algorithmic advice into account.
Previous studies, however, reached conflicting conclu-
sions regarding the conditions under which algorithm
aversion emerges (Logg et al. 2019). Specifically, there is a
debate about whether people generally prefer human
advice to algorithmic advice (Castelo et al. 2019) or
whether people’s reliance on an algorithm only decreases
after becoming familiar with the algorithm, which means to
observe its performance (Dietvorst et al. 2015). Existing
research has suggested various causes for algorithm aver-
sion (Burton et al. 2020). A prominent idea among those
studies is that people are less forgiving toward erring
algorithms than toward erring humans (Dietvorst et al.
2015) because people disregard the possibility that algo-
rithms can overcome their shortcomings and grow from
them. In the context of decision support, erring means to
provide advice that in the end turns out to be not fully
accurate as is common for decisions under uncertainty.
Accordingly, people tend to rely less on an algorithmic
advisor than on a human advisor after becoming familiar
with the advisor and observing the advisor to err, even if
the erring algorithmic advisor objectively outperforms the
erring human advisor. In this study, we juxtapose the two
understandings of algorithm aversion in the context of
decision support to answer the following research question:
RQ1 Do people exhibit a general algorithm aversion or
do they prefer human to algorithmic decision support only
after observing that the decision support errs?
If people indeed shun erring algorithmic support
because they disregard the possibility that algorithms can
improve, demonstrating the opposite (i.e., an algorithm’s
ability to learn) should alleviate algorithm aversion.
However, existing research has not examined whether there
are differences in algorithm aversion to DSS with and
without the ability to learn. Therefore, we specifically
investigate whether demonstrating an algorithm’s ability to
learn can contribute to overcoming algorithm aversion. We
focus on the ability to learn for two reasons: Demonstrating
an algorithm’s ongoing improvement in performance to
users is theoretically intriguing because this design feature
may counter users’ algorithm aversion and consequently
increase their willingness to rely on particular AI-based
systems. Moreover, the increasing application of machine
learning in practice is especially relevant for tasks that
algorithms can support, such as classification or forecasting
(Jordan and Mitchell 2015). Therefore, we pose a second
research question:
RQ2 Does demonstrating an algorithm’s ability to learn
alleviate algorithm aversion?
To answer our research questions, we conducted an
incentive-compatible online experiment with 452 subjects.
Within this experiment, participants had to solve a fore-
casting task while deciding to what degree they would rely
on an erring advisor to increase their odds of receiving a
bonus. We manipulated the advisor to examine how its
nature (i.e., human vs. algorithmic), its familiarity to the
participants (i.e., unfamiliar vs. familiar), and its ability to
learn (i.e., non-learning vs. learning) affect the partici-
pants’ reliance on the advice. Our results do not indicate a
general aversion to algorithmic advice but a negative effect
of familiarity on the participants’ willingness to accept
algorithmic advice. However, if the algorithm is able to
learn, the negative effect of familiarity disappears.
Our study makes a major, threefold contribution to
research on algorithm aversion and the interaction with AI-
based systems: First, we shed light on the algorithm aver-
sion phenomenon by substantiating that becoming familiar
with an erring algorithm is an important boundary condi-
tion for this phenomenon. Second, we demonstrate that the
experience during the familiarization with an algorithm
plays a key role in relying on an algorithm’s advice. Third,
we provide first insights on an AI-based system’s ability to
learn as an increasingly important but hitherto underex-
plored design characteristic, which may counter algorithm
1 We acknowledge that an algorithm is a processing logic to solve a
task and that it is, thus, only a part of an IT system. Since previous
research has labeled the phenomenon addressed in this study as
algorithm aversion although users rather interact with IT systems than
with algorithms, we use the terms algorithm and IT system
interchangeably in this study. The same applies to the terms
algorithmic advisors and DSS.
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aversion. Thereby, we answer the call for research on
individuals’ interaction with AI-based systems (Buxmann
et al. 2019). Our findings also hold important implications
for the design and employment of continually learning
systems. Specifically, developers may seek to emphasize
these systems’ ability to learn in order to enhance users’




The literature on algorithm aversion is rooted in the con-
troversy over the merits of clinical (i.e., based on deliberate
human thought) and actuarial (i.e., based on statistic
models) judgement in different domains, such as medical
diagnosis and treatment (Meehl 1954; Dawes 1979; Dawes
et al. 1989; Grove et al. 2000). Overall, this research
concludes that actuarial data interpretation is superior to
clinical analysis but that humans nevertheless show a ten-
dency to resist purely actuarial judgement. This resistance
extends to the use of algorithmic decision support when
compared to human advice (Promberger and Baron 2006;
Alvarado-Valencia and Barrero 2014). Evidence from IS
research supports these findings: For instance, Lim and
O’Connor (1996) demonstrate that people underutilize
information from DSS when making decisions. Elkins et al.
(2013) find that expert system users feel threatened by
system recommendations contradicting their expertise and
thus tend to ignore these recommendations. Furthermore,
the results by Leyer and Schneider (2019) indicate that
managers are less likely to delegate strategic decisions to
an AI-based DSS than to another human. While most
empirical evidence supports the existence of algorithm
aversion, other studies observed an appreciation of algo-
rithmic advice (Dijkstra et al. 1998; Logg et al. 2019) or
even an exaggerated reliance on AI-based systems (Dijk-
stra 1999; Wagner et al. 2018). Similarly, Gunaratne et al.
(2018) reveal that humans tend to follow algorithmic
financial advice more closely than identical crowdsourced
advice. Therefore, our study seeks to contribute toward
untangling these contradicting findings. Table A1 in the
digital online appendix (available online via http://link.
springer.com) provides an overview of recent studies on
algorithm aversion.
When comparing studies on algorithm aversion, it is
important to note that two differing understandings of the
term algorithm aversion exist (Dietvorst et al. 2015; Logg
et al. 2019). Dietvorst et al. (2015) coined the term for the
choice of inferior human over superior algorithmic judge-
ment. However, their study specifically shows that people
shun algorithmic decision making after having interacted
and thus becoming familiar with the particular system. The
commonly proposed reason for this behavior is that users
devalue algorithmic advice after observing the algorithm to
err, which means following the algorithmic advice still
holds the risk of making suboptimal decisions (Prahl and
Van Swol 2017; Dietvorst et al. 2015; Dzindolet et al.
2002). In contrast, other studies require participants to
decide about their reliance on algorithmic advice before
becoming familiar with the algorithm’s performance
(Castelo et al. 2019; Longoni et al. 2019; Logg et al. 2019).
These differences result in two varying understandings of
what algorithm aversion is: unwillingness to rely on an
algorithm that a user has experienced to err versus general
resistance to algorithmic judgement. Our study aims at
improving our understanding of algorithm aversion by
investigating both understandings of this phenomenon in
one common setting.
Previous research has suggested manifold predictors of
algorithm aversion, such as the perceived subjectivity and
uniqueness of tasks (Castelo et al. 2019; Longoni et al.
2019), the decision maker’s expertise (Whitecotton 1996)
as well as the algorithm’s understandability (Yeomans
et al. 2019). Burton et al. (2020) assorted possible causes of
algorithm aversion into five categories: decision makers’
false expectations regarding the algorithms’ capabilities
and performance, lack of control residing with the decision
maker, incentive structures discriminating against the use
of algorithmic decision support, incompatibility of intuitive
human decision making and algorithmic calculations, and
conflicting concepts of rationality between humans and
algorithms. This study addresses the first of these cate-
gories: It specifically deals with the reasoning that people
are less lenient toward algorithms than toward other
humans because people expect algorithms to be perfect and
do not believe that algorithms can overcome their errors
(Dietvorst et al. 2015; Dawes 1979), whereas humans gain
experience over time (Highhouse 2008). If this reasoning
were true, then people should exhibit lower aversion
toward an erring algorithm demonstrating the ability to
learn than toward an erring algorithm that does not
demonstrate the ability to learn. Existent studies have
suggested several measures to enhance the use of DSS:
allowing for minor adjustments of the algorithm by the
decision maker (Dietvorst et al. 2018); improving the
system design (Fildes et al. 2006; Benbasat and Taylor
1978); and training decision makers in the DSS use (Green
and Hughes 1986; Mackay and Elam 1992). However,
despite the increasing application of machine learning, we
do not yet know how decision makers react to advice by
AI-based systems that demonstrate the ability to learn and,
thus, perceivably improve over time. We address this
research gap in this study.
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2.2 Ability to Learn
AI researchers employ various approaches to realize
computational capabilities (Russell and Norvig 2010). The
approach that enabled most of the recent breakthroughs in
AI research is machine learning (Jordan and Mitchell
2015). Mitchell (1997, p. 2) defines machine learning as
follows: ‘‘A computer program is said to learn from
experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and
performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as
measured by P, improves with experience E.’’ Specifically,
machine learning allows equipping systems with func-
tionalities via data-based training instead of manual cod-
ing. We refer to such systems as AI-based systems because
machine learning is part of the AI domain. Owing to
algorithmic improvements, the increasing availability of
training data, and decreasing costs of computation,
machine learning has spurred substantial progress in the
realization of several computational capabilities, such as
computer vision, speech recognition, natural language
processing, and decision support within AI-based systems
(Jordan and Mitchell 2015).
When incorporating machine learning in IT systems, we
can distinguish between training prior to system deploy-
ment (until the system meets specific performance thresh-
olds) and ongoing (i.e., continual) learning after system
deployment (Parisi et al. 2019). The latter is necessary if
the available data is insufficient to train the system up to a
desired level or if the system must be able to adapt to
varying environmental conditions or user characteristics.
For instance, DSS that depend on their users’ personal
information suffer from a cold-start problem at the begin-
ning of their use (Liebman et al. 2019). Among continually
learning systems, we can further differentiate between
those that explicitly involve users in the learning process
(i.e., interactive or cooperative learning) and those that
implicitly improve over time (Amershi et al. 2014; Saun-
ders et al. 2016). In case of explicit learning, the user is part
of the training loop and can exert influence on the process.
Examples of explicit learning applications are data labeling
(Wang and Hua 2011) and video game design (Seidel et al.
2018). Implicit learning systems improve over time without
depending on explicit user feedback by either relying on
other data sources or observing users’ behavior. Search
engines, for instance, optimize the ranking of their search
results by drawing upon clickstream data (Joachims and
Radlinski 2007).
Whereas previous research has investigated the human
role in interactive learning settings (Amershi et al. 2014),
little is known about users’ reactions toward implicit
learning systems. Zhang et al. (2011) show that retailer
learning conceptualized as the quality of personalized
product recommendations on an e-commerce website
reduces customers’ product screening and evaluation costs
while enhancing decision-making quality. Besides this
study, we are not aware of research that has investigated
whether humans perceive the ability to learn of AI-based
systems and, if so, which consequences these perceptions
have. Given the increasing use of machine learning and
early calls for research on this matter (Liang 1987), our
study seeks to provide first evidence on AI-based system
users’ perceptions of the ability to learn.
3 Hypotheses Development
The common result of early research on the appreciation of
algorithmic judgement is that people generally prefer
human judgement despite its oftentimes inferior quality
(Dawes et al. 1989). However, recent research findings on
the effects of advisor nature (i.e., human or algorithmic)
challenge this conclusion: On the one hand, underutiliza-
tion of algorithmic advice may at least partially reflect the
decision maker’s overconfidence and egocentric advice
discounting (Logg et al. 2019; Soll and Mannes 2011).
Therefore, it is important to compare the reliance on
algorithmic judgement not against the decision maker’s
own judgement but against the reliance on another human’s
judgement. On the other hand, several studies on algorithm
aversion have employed tasks, such as recommending
jokes (Yeomans et al. 2019) or medical treatment (Prom-
berger and Baron 2006). The quality of decisions in these
settings is often subjective or depends on the decision
maker’s personal characteristics (Longoni et al. 2019;
Castelo et al. 2019). However, Castelo et al. (2019) show
that algorithm aversion reduces if people perceive tasks to
be more objective. Logg et al. (2019) and Gunaratne et al.
(2018) even gather evidence for algorithm appreciation in
several numeric forecasting tasks. The control group find-
ings by Dietvorst et al. (2015) and the results by Prahl and
Van Swol (2017) substantiate the idea of algorithm
appreciation unless people have become familiar with an
erring algorithm’s performance. Following this recent
evidence, we suggest that in a decision task with an
objectively measurable outcome that is independent of the
decision maker’s personal characteristics, there is no rea-
son to generally devalue advice from an algorithm the
decision maker is not familiar with. Instead, human deci-
sion makers may even favor algorithmic advice because an
algorithmic advisor’s abilities are complementary to their
own while those of a human advisor are not (Prahl and Van
Swol 2017; Dellermann et al. 2019; Dawes 1979).
Accordingly, we hypothesize:
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H1 For an objective and non-personal decision task,
human decision makers exhibit algorithm appreciation if
they are unfamiliar with the advisor’s performance.
While the literature generally offers mixed results
regarding preferences for advisor nature, there is clear
evidence of experience with an erring algorithmic advisor
having a negative effect on the reliance on this advisor
(Dietvorst et al. 2015; Prahl and Van Swol 2017). An
important precondition for this effect is that the experience
with the algorithmic advisor allows decision makers to
determine that the advisor errs. Otherwise, people tend to
continually rely on incorrect advice (Dijkstra 1999). A
common explanation for this phenomenon is that people
expect an algorithm’s advice to be perfect (Dzindolet et al.
2002; Highhouse 2008). However, in decisions under
uncertainty neither humans nor algorithms can provide
perfect advice. A disconfirmation of this expectation then
leads to lower reliance on the algorithm compared to a
similarly performant or even inferior human (Dietvorst
et al. 2015). This reasoning is also in line with IS research
on continued system use (Bhattacherjee and Lin 2015).
Following the call by Castelo et al. (2019) for more
research on how experience with algorithms influences
their use, we thus propose:
H2a For an objective and non-personal decision task,
familiarity with an advisor’s performance moderates the
effect of advisor nature on a human decision maker’s
reliance on the advice if the advisor errs.
H2b For an objective and non-personal decision task,
human decision makers rely more on the advice of an
unfamiliar algorithm than on the advice of a familiar
algorithm if the advisor errs.
H2c For an objective and non-personal decision task,
human decision makers exhibit algorithm aversion if they
are familiar with the advisor’s performance and the advi-
sor errs.
If experiencing an algorithm to err causes a deterioration
of reliance on this algorithm’s advice owing to unmet
performance expectations (Dzindolet et al. 2002; Prahl and
Van Swol 2017), a positive experience of an algorithm’s
performance may conversely encourage a decision maker
to rely on the algorithm (Alvarado-Valencia and Barrero
2014). In their study of algorithm aversion, Dietvorst et al.
(2015) measured a set of beliefs about differences between
human and algorithmic forecasts from the participants’
perspective. While the participants thought that algorithms
outperformed humans in avoiding obvious mistakes and
weighing information consistently, they strongly believed
that humans were much better than algorithms at learning
from mistakes and improving with practice. However, in
light of the recent technological advances in AI and the
increasing use of machine learning (Jordan and Mitchell
2015), these beliefs are not necessarily accurate, especially
in the domain of objective and non-personal decision tasks.
Likewise, we suggest that an algorithm’s ability to learn
(i.e., to improve over time) can reduce the detrimental
effect that familiarity with an erring algorithm has on the
decision maker’s reliance on the algorithm’s advice. Nat-
urally, this is only possible if users can recognize the
algorithm’s ability to learn, which means the algorithm
must demonstrate this ability. Furthermore, we expect this
effect to hold only for algorithmic advisors because human
advisors are expected to be able to learn. Therefore, our last
hypotheses are:
H3a For an objective and non-personal decision task,
demonstrating an advisor’s ability to learn moderates the
effect of advisor nature on the reliance on a familiar and
erring advisor.
H3b For an objective and non-personal decision task,
human decision makers rely more on the advice of a
familiar and erring algorithm with the ability to learn than
on the advice of a familiar and erring algorithm without
this ability.
H3c For an objective and non-personal decision task,
human decision makers do not exhibit algorithm aversion if
they are familiar with the advisor’s performance and the
advisor is erring but has the ability to learn.
Overall, we suggest that the nature of an advisor in an
objective and non-personal decision task has an effect on
the decision maker’s reliance on the advice in favor of an
algorithmic advisor (H1). However, becoming familiar
with the advisor’s performance before deciding whether to
rely on its advice moderates this effect if the advisor errs
(H2a). As a result, the reliance on a familiar and erring
algorithmic advisor is lower than the reliance on an unfa-
miliar algorithmic advisor (H2b) and lower than the reli-
ance on a familiar and erring human advisor (H2c). Lastly,
an algorithm’s ability to learn moderates the effect of
advisor nature on the reliance on a familiar advisor (H3a)
such that the ability to learn increases the reliance on a
familiar and erring algorithmic advisor (H3b) and resolves
algorithm aversion (H3c).
4 Method
4.1 Experimental Design and Procedure
To test the hypotheses, we conducted an incentive-com-
patible online experiment in accordance with most research
on algorithm aversion (Burton et al. 2020). An online
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experiment fitted the purpose of our study because it
allowed us to measure the potential effects precisely and
with high internal validity. Our experiment had a between-
subject design with manipulations of advisor nature (hu-
man vs. algorithmic), familiarity (non-familiar vs. famil-
iar), and ability to learn (non-learning vs. learning). Since
the ability to learn can affect decision makers’ behavior
only if they are familiar with the advisor, we could not
employ a traditional full factorial design. Instead, we
subdivided the experimental groups becoming familiar
with the advisor into those experiencing a non-learning and
those experiencing a learning advisor. Table 1 depicts our
experimental design.
In our online experiment, we asked the participants to
make a forecast within a business setting. The experimental
procedure comprised six steps (see Fig. 1): In the first step,
we welcomed all the participants and instructed them to
answer all questions thoroughly. Furthermore, we informed
them about the presence of attention checks, the monetary
incentivization, and the payment modalities. The second
step encompassed the introduction of our experimental
setting. We asked the participants to imagine working as a
call center manager and being responsible for the staffing.
The call center had just recently acquired a new client. The
number of incoming calls for this client’s hotline opera-
tions now had to be estimated on a regular basis to make
appropriate staffing decisions. The participants’ task was to
estimate the number of incoming calls for a specific day
and the accuracy of their estimation partly determined their
remuneration for taking part in the study. Accordingly, the
participants had an incentive to put their best effort in the
estimations. We chose this task because it is a common
forecasting problem in business, of objective and non-
personal nature, and suitable for machine-learning-based
IT support (Ebadi Jalal et al. 2016; Fukunaga et al. 2002).
The participants received several aids, which enabled them
to make sophisticated estimations. First, we told the par-
ticipants that the number of calls on an average day would
be 5000. Second, the participants received information
about six variables influencing the number of calls on a
specific day:
• The quarter of the year (ranging from Q1 to Q4);
• The day of the month (ranging from 1 to 31);
• The day of the week (ranging from Monday to Friday);
• The running of a promotion campaign (either yes or
no);
• The recent sales (in percent below or above average);
and
• The recent website traffic (in percent below or above
average).
For all of these variables, we provided the participants
with a short explanation about their effects on the number
of incoming calls. Third, the participants received an
advisor’s estimation based on the six variables’ specific
values on the date for which the participants had to make
their forecast. Lastly, we told the participants that they had
to make eight training estimations before their final and
incentivized estimation.
After receiving this information, the participants had to
answer several comprehension questions before proceeding
to the third step of the experimental procedure (see
Table A7 in the digital appendix). This third step com-
prised the eight training estimations and was inspired by
Dietvorst et al.’s (2015) experimental setting. This training
phase was necessary to ensure that the participants could
become familiar with the advisor. The participants in the
conditions of not becoming familiar with the advisor had a
training phase without the advisor to prevent confounds
that could potentially distort the results. After completing
the training estimations, we once more informed the par-
ticipants that their ninth and final estimation (i.e., serious
phase) would determine the variable share of their pay-
ment. The final forecast constituted the fourth step of the
experiment and included the measurement of the dependent
variable. This step was followed by a post-experimental
questionnaire containing control and demographic vari-
ables (step 5). In the sixth and last step, we informed the
participants about the accuracy of their final estimation and
provided them with payment details.
4.2 Experimental Treatments
We administered our experimental treatments in the second
and third step of the experimental procedure. In H-U and
A-U (i.e., the unfamiliar advisor conditions), the partici-
pants read in the scenario explanation that they would
familiarize themselves with the task during the eight
training estimations. However, for the ninth estimation,
which determined the participants’ bonus payments, they
would receive an advice from an advisor. Depending on the
experimental condition, we introduced the advisor either as
an ‘‘Industry Expert’’ (H-U) with long-standing experience
in the field or as a ‘‘Prediction Software’’ (A-U) with a
Table 1 Experimental design
Human Algorithmic
Unfamiliar H-U A-U
Familiar Non-learning H-F-N A-F-N
Learning H-F-L A-F-L
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long-standing product history in the field. As such, the
participants knew from the beginning that they would
encounter an advisor in the last stage of the scenario. In
contrast to H-U and A-U, we explained the remaining
groups (i.e., the familiar advisor conditions) that they
would also receive advice throughout the training estima-
tions in the scenario. The advisor introductions for H-F-N
and H-F-L were the same as for H-U (i.e., the human
advisor conditions) and the advisor introductions for A-F-
N and A-F-L were the same as for A-U (i.e., the algo-
rithmic advisor conditions).
The eight training estimations in the third step of the
experiment proceeded as follows: For each round, we
showed the participants a specific date along with the levels
of the six variables listed in the last section. We selected
the eight dates randomly and presented them to the par-
ticipants in chronological order. While the levels of the first
three variables (quarter of the year, day of the month, and
day of the week) depended on the chosen date, we gener-
ated the levels for the remaining variables (promotion
campaign, recent sales, and website traffic) randomly for
each of the dates. All the participants saw the same dates
and the same variable levels in the same order. Based on
the six variable levels, we calculated a true number of calls
for each date, which the participants did not know but had
to estimate. The digital appendix contains an explanation
of the exact calculations (Tables A2–A6). At the end of
each training round, we revealed the true value to the
participants such that they could evaluate the accuracy of
their estimation. In H-U and A-U, this happened immedi-
ately after the participants had submitted their estimations
because no advisor was involved in these conditions. In the
other groups, the participants received the advisor estima-
tion after submitting their estimation but before receiving
the true value. The participants in these conditions could,
thus, not only evaluate their own but also the advisor’s
estimation performance, i.e. becoming familiar with the
advisor. The advisor estimations did not differ between
human and algorithmic advisors but between non-learning
(H-F-N and A-F-N) and learning advisors (H-F-L and A-F-
L). While advisors of either nature erred, the learning
advisor continually improved in performance, whereas the
non-learning advisor did not (see Fig. 2). The average
change in prediction errors from round to round (i.e., the
error fluctuation) was the same for both types of advisors
(12.3%). However, the non-learning advisor had a lower
average prediction error (5.5%) than the learning advisor
(6.3%). Furthermore, both types of advisors had the same
accuracy in the eighth round (4.5%). Accordingly, a
favorable perception of the learning advisor is
attributable neither to overall performance advantages
during the training nor to a lower prediction error in the
eighth training round, which might have caused unintended
recency effects on the following incentivized estimation.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3














Actual number of 
round 9
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Fig. 1 Experimental procedure
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The convex shape of the learning curve with decreasing
performance gains based on additional data corresponds to
the learning pattern of machine learning algorithms when
applied in new contexts as represented by the new call
center client in our scenario (NVIDIA Corporation 2020).
To ascertain that the advisor’s estimations were not too
far from or too close to the participants’ estimations and
thus created unintended confound, we conducted a pretest
with 248 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. The
participants had to provide estimations in a scenario similar
to our final experiment. The average prediction error of the
participants’ estimations was 5.5%. Therefore, we designed
the advisors’ estimations in our actual experiment to have a
similar prediction error on average.
Lastly, we conducted a second pretest with 267 partic-
ipants from Amazon Mechanical Turk experiencing one of
the six treatments to examine whether our experimental
treatments would work as intended. We used manipulation
checks for perceived learning (e.g., ‘‘The Prediction Soft-
ware gained a good understanding of how to properly
estimate the number of calls.’’) by Alavi et al. (2002),
anthropomorphism (e.g., ‘‘The source of advice is …’’
‘‘machinelike … humanlike’’) by Bartneck et al. (2009) and
Benlian et al. (2020), and familiarity with the advisor (e.g.,
‘‘Overall, I am familiar with the Industry Expert’’) by
Gefen (2000) and Kim et al. (2009). Table A11 in the
digital appendix contains the manipulation checks. The
results of the second pretest indicated that all treatments
would work as intended: First, H-F-L and A-F-L exhibited
a significantly higher level of perceived learning than H-F-
N and A-F-N (F = 5.53, p\ 0.05). Second, H-F-N, H-F-L,
A-F-N, and A-F-L exhibited a significantly higher level of
familiarity than H-U and A-U (F = 3.00, p\ 0.1). Lastly,
H-U, H-F-N, and H-F-L exhibited a significantly higher
level of anthropomorphism than A-U, A-F-N, and A-F-L
(F = 4.46, p\ 0.05).
4.3 Measures
The measurement of our dependent variable was part of the
incentive-compatible estimation (step 4) in our experiment.
Previous studies on algorithm aversion made use of dif-
ferent instruments to measure a decision maker’s reliance
on advice. Whereas a number of studies required their
participants to fully rely on either the advice or their own
judgement (Dietvorst et al. 2015), we chose to use a more
fine-grained measure. Specifically, we followed Logg et al.
(2019) in employing the judge-advisor paradigm (Sniezek
and Buckley 1995) to measure the advisor’s influence on
the decision maker. In the context of our experiment, this
framework requires the decision maker to provide an initial
estimation before receiving the advisor’s estimation (like
during the training phase in step 3) and an adjusted esti-
mation after receiving the advice, which was not the case in
the training estimations. The decision maker’s initial esti-
mation, adjusted estimation, and the advisor’s estimation
then allow calculating the weight of advice (WOA):
WOA ¼ adjusted estimation initial estimation
advisor0s estimation initial estimation
A WOA of 0 means that decision makers do not adjust
but remain with their initial estimation and thus ignore the
advice. In contrast, a WOA of 1 represents a full adoption
of the advisor’s estimation. Any values in between reflect
the degree to which decision makers take their initial
estimation and the advisor’s estimation into account for
their adjusted estimation. Values below 0 or above 1 may
also occur if decision makers believe that the true value lies
outside the interval of their initial and the advisor’s esti-
mation. Whereas several studies decide to winsorize such
values (Logg et al. 2019), we retained these values as they
were. Departing from the advisor’s estimation (WOA\ 0)
or overweighting the advisor’s estimation (WOA[ 1) may
be due to the participants’ deliberate choices depending on































Fig. 2 Prediction errors of
advisors for each training round
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performance in the training phase (Prahl and Van Swol
2017). Based on the WOA values within the different
experimental groups, we intended to apply bootstrapped
moderation analyses to test H2a as well as H3a and
ANOVAs with planned contrasts to test the remaining
hypotheses.
Besides our dependent variable, we measured several
control and demographic variables in the post-experimental
questionnaire (see Tables A8 and A9 in the digital
appendix). Among those were the participants’ trusting
disposition (Gefen and Straub 2004), personal innovative-
ness (Agarwal and Prasad 1998), experience in working for
call centers as well as calling hotlines, and knowledge
about call centers (based on Flynn and Goldsmith (1999)).
Furthermore, we asked the participants for their age, gen-
der, and education. Between the control and demographic
variables, we placed an attention check (see Table A10 in
the digital appendix). Lastly, we measured the participant’s
perceived realism of the scenario.
4.4 Data Collection
To collect sample data, we recruited participants from
Amazon Mechanical Turk, a viable and reliable crowd-
sourcing platform for behavioral research and experiments
(Karahanna et al. 2018; Behrend et al. 2011; Steelman et al.
2014). Using Amazon Mechanical Turk is a suitable sam-
pling strategy for our research, as it enables us to reach
users who are internet savvy but not expert forecasters.
Since experienced professionals have been shown to rely
less on algorithmic advice than lay people, our sample is
thus more conservative (Logg et al. 2019). We restricted
participation to users who are situated in the U.S. and who
exhibited a high approval rating (i.e., at least 95%) to
ascertain high data quality (Goodman and Paolacci 2017).
Moreover, we incentivized the attentive participation by
mentioning that participants could receive up to twice the
base payment as a bonus, depending on the accuracy of
their final estimation.
From 636 participants completing the questionnaire, we
removed those who failed the attention check or inserted
values for the incentivized ninth estimation below 100. We
further removed participants who exhibited outlier char-
acteristics in the ninth estimation in the form of excep-
tionally fast (i.e., less than 7 s) or slow (i.e., more than
99 s) estimation times in any of the estimations. The final
sample comprised 452 participants. Table 2 provides
descriptive information of the analyzed data set.
To confirm the participants’ random assignment to the
different experimental conditions based on our control and
demographic variables, we conducted Fisher’s exact tests
for the categorical variables and a MANOVA for the
metric variables. There are no significant differences in
trusting disposition, personal innovativeness, experience in
working for call centers as well as calling hotlines, and
knowledge about call centers between the six experimental
groups (all p[ 0.1). We also did not find differences
regarding demographics in terms of gender, age, or edu-
cation (all p[ 0.1). Lastly, the participants across all
groups indicated that they perceived the experiment as
realistic (mean = 5.6; std. dev. = 1.1).
5 Results
We tested our hypotheses by conducting a series of anal-
yses in IBM SPSS Statistics 25.
To test H1 – the effect of advisor nature on WOA if the
advisors are unfamiliar – we conducted an ANOVA com-
paring H-U with A-U. The test revealed no significant main
effect between the two groups (F = 2.14, p[ 0.1). As
such, H1 is not supported in that the participants do not
significantly rely more on the unfamiliar algorithmic
advisor than on the unfamiliar human advisor.
For H2a, we conducted a bootstrap moderation analysis
with 10,000 samples and a 95% confidence interval (CI)
with data from H-U, A-U, H-F-N, and A-F-N to test
whether familiarity moderates the effect of advisor nature
(Hayes 2017, PROCESS model 1). The results of our
moderation analysis (see Fig. 3) show that familiarity
Table 2 Descriptive sample information
Groups N Mean
WOA (%) Age Gender (male) (%)
H-U 68 58.0 40.6 45.6
A-U 83 74.6 41.5 54.2
H-F-N 72 64.2 39.3 44.4
A-F-N 70 39.9 40.0 54.3
H-F-L 70 54.9 39.1 35.7



















Fig. 3 Interaction plot for H-U, A-U, H-F-N, and A-F-N
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moderates the effect of advisor nature on WOA (interaction
effect = - 0.41, standard error = 0.18, p\ 0.05). Specifi-
cally, the effect of advisor nature reverses when the advisor
is familiar (effect = - 0.24, standard error = 0.13) com-
pared to when the advisor is unfamiliar (effect = 0.17,
standard error = 0.13), supporting H2a. To test H2b and
H2c, we conducted a two-way independent ANOVA with
planned contrasts among the same groups. The interaction
effect between advisor nature and familiarity is significant
(F = 5.20, p\ 0.05), thus confirming the results of our
moderation analysis. The pairwise comparison between
A-U and A-F-N (p\ 0.01) is significant and that between
H-F-N and A-F-N (p\ 0.1) is marginally significant.
These results provide support for H2b and weak support for
H2c.
For H3a, we conducted a bootstrap moderation analysis
with 10,000 samples and a 95% confidence interval with
data from groups H-F-N, A-F-N, H-F-L, and A-F-L to test
whether demonstrating the ability to learn moderates the
effect of advisor nature if the advisor is familiar (Hayes
2017, PROCESS model 1). The results of our moderation
analysis (see Fig. 4) show that demonstrating the ability to
learn moderates the effect of advisor nature on WOA (in-
teraction effect = 0.33, standard error = 0.16, p\ 0.05).
Specifically, the negative effect of interacting with an
algorithmic (vs. human) familiar advisor reverses when the
familiar advisor demonstrates the ability to learn (ef-
fect = 0.09, standard error = 0.11) compared to when the
familiar advisor does not learn (effect = - 0.24, standard
error = 0.12), supporting H3a. We again conducted a two-
way independent ANOVA with planned contrasts among
the same groups to test H3b and H3c. The interaction effect
between advisor nature and ability to learn is also signifi-
cant (F = 4.24, p\ 0.05), thus confirming the results of
our moderation analysis. Similarly, the pairwise compar-
ison between A-F-N and A-F-L is significant (p\ 0.05),
while the pairwise comparison between H-F-L and A-F-L
is not (p[ 0.1). These results support both H3b and H3c.
6 Discussion
Algorithm aversion has spurred controversial discussions
in previous research, which resulted in differing under-
standings of this phenomenon. In this study, we set out to
contribute toward clarifying what algorithm aversion is and
under which conditions algorithm aversion occurs. Previ-
ous studies have produced conflicting findings about
whether people are generally averse to algorithmic judge-
ment or avoid algorithms only if they perceive these
algorithms to err. Furthermore, we sought to investigate
whether demonstrating an algorithm’s ability to learn may
serve as an effective countermeasure against algorithm
aversion, given that this ability becomes increasingly
prevalent in AI-based systems. We studied these questions
by simulating a forecasting task within a business setting.
The accuracy of both the decision makers’ and the simu-
lated advisors’ estimations were objectively measurable
and did not depend on the decision makers’ personal
characteristics. These important boundary conditions are
true for many business decisions but should be considered
when comparing our results with those of earlier studies
(Castelo et al. 2019).
According to our results, humans do not generally (i.e.,
without being familiar with the advisor) prefer human to
algorithmic advice. While we hypothesized the opposite
(i.e., algorithm appreciation) to be true in the context of our
study, our findings do not support this claim. Instead, the
participants in our experiment relied to a similar degree on
advice coming from an unfamiliar human and an unfa-
miliar algorithmic advisor. The role of familiarity, how-
ever, distinguishes the two understandings of algorithm
aversion. Following the reasoning of Dietvorst et al.
(2015), people shun algorithmic but not human advice after
becoming familiar with the advisor. In other words,
familiarity with the advisor interacts with nature of the
advisor. The results of our experiment strongly support this
claim and, thus, the understanding of algorithm aversion
put forward by Dietvorst et al. (2015). Becoming familiar
with the advisor reduced the reliance on the algorithmic but
not on the human advisor despite their performance (i.e.,
the accuracy of their estimations in the training period)
being identical.
What are possible reasons for this interaction? We
adopted a line of argument from prior research, which
suggests that erring weighs more severely for algorithmic
than for human advisors because humans may overcome
their weaknesses while algorithms may not (Highhouse
2008; Dzindolet et al. 2002; Dietvorst et al. 2015). If this
were true, demonstrating an algorithm’s ability to learn
should reduce algorithm aversion. Therefore, we manipu-



















Fig. 4 Interaction plot for H-F-N, A-F-N, H-F-L, and A-F-L
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estimations, which allowed the participants to become
familiar with the advisor. Demonstrating the ability to learn
requires the advisor to improve during the training esti-
mations. This, in turn, means that the learning advisors
initially must have a higher prediction error than the non-
learning advisors to prevent strong performance differences
between them. Accordingly, demonstrating the ability to
learn means to elicit even higher algorithm aversion ini-
tially and compensating this disadvantage through
improvement over time. Indeed, our results show that users
honor an algorithm’s ability to learn. The participants in
our experiment relied more on the learning than on the non-
learning algorithmic advisor in their incentivized estima-
tion. Moreover, we could not find differences between
reliance on the learning algorithmic advisor and reliance on
the learning human advisor. These findings strongly sup-
port the idea that demonstrating an algorithm’s ability to
learn is a promising countermeasure against algorithm
aversion. Furthermore, our results indicate that people’s
beliefs about differences between humans’ and algorithms’
abilities to learn contribute to algorithm aversion. How-
ever, these beliefs are not necessarily accurate, given that
machine learning enables IT systems to overcome errors by
considering subsequent feedback on their performance.
Demonstrating an AI-based system’s ability to learn may,
thus, update these beliefs and prevent costly behavioral
biases in decision making.
7 Implications
Our findings hold important implications for understanding
decision makers’ reliance on AI-based systems under
uncertainty, thereby answering the call for research on
individuals’ reaction to and collaboration with AI-based
systems (Buxmann et al. 2019).
We contribute to previous literature on algorithm aver-
sion by comparing the reliance on an unfamiliar and a
familiar algorithmic advisor to the reliance on an unfa-
miliar and a familiar human advisor of identical perfor-
mance. Algorithm aversion was evident only if decision
makers were familiar with the advisor. Therefore, we rec-
ommend using the term algorithm aversion only for the
negative effect that familiarization with an algorithmic
advisor has on reliance on this advisor, as was initially
suggested by Dietvorst et al. (2015). Our results, further-
more, suggest that a general aversion to algorithmic
judgement does not exist in objective and non-personal
decision contexts. Different findings in early and recent
studies on this topic may partly stem from the growing
diffusion of algorithms in people’s everyday life and a
corresponding accustomation to algorithms.
Additionally, we show that the experience during
familiarization determines the effect that becoming famil-
iar with an algorithmic advisor has on relying on this
advisor. We argue that if the experience does not meet
decision makers’ expectations of the advisor, the decision
makers’ reliance decreases. This is a reasonable reaction.
However, if decision makers’ expectations of an algorith-
mic advisor are overly high (i.e., decision makers expect an
algorithmic advisor to provide perfect advice under
uncertainty), this reaction may lead to an irrational dis-
counting of algorithmic advice. Our results indicate this
effect by contrasting the familiarization with an erring
algorithmic advisor with the familiarization with an iden-
tical human advisor. Yet, improving the experience during
the familiarization is an effective countermeasure against
this effect. We find that demonstrating the ability to learn
(i.e., improving over time) is such a countermeasure.
Specifically, the continual improvement of the learning
algorithmic advisor in our experiment outweighed its initial
performance deficits in comparison to the non-learning
advisor. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first
to show that users can recognize an algorithm’s ability to
learn and that this perception has positive effects on the
users’ behavior toward the algorithm.
Practitioners may also gain useful insights from our
study. Companies that provide or seek to employ DSS in
contexts under uncertainty should consider possible nega-
tive effects of users becoming familiar with IS. To counter
these effects, companies employing DSS in such contexts
should manage their employees’ expectations of what IT
systems can and cannot accomplish. Regarding the current
debate on the effects of AI-based systems as black boxes
(Maedche et al. 2019), our findings suggest that IS devel-
opers should invest in demonstrating and communicating
the abilities of their IT systems to users. In case of AI-
based systems with the ability to learn, this includes
transparently demonstrating the system’s performance
improvements over time. Potential measures to emphasize
these improvements are displaying performance compar-
isons to previous advices and periodical reports on the
performance development of IT systems.
8 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
Like any research, our study has a few limitations, which
also provide leads for further research. First, we designed
our study as a simulated online experiment. Even though
the experiment was incentive-compatible and of high
internal validity, the results do not represent reliance on an
algorithmic advisor with a highly consequential decision.
Similarly, the participants in our experiment were crowd-
workers acquired on Amazon Mechanical Turk. These
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participants are likely to be more tech-savvy than the
average population and may thus be less likely to exhibit
algorithm aversion. As such, it would be interesting to test
our hypotheses in a longitudinal field study with a real-
world algorithmic advisor to strengthen external validity.
Second, our study only constitutes an initial investigation
into how demonstrating the ability to learn affects relying
on algorithmic advice. Our experimental treatment con-
fronted the participants with an algorithmic advisor
exhibiting a stylized learning curve to allow for an unbi-
ased comparison to a non-learning advisor. However, we
know little about how bad the initial performance may be
without losing decision makers’ confidence in the advisor
or how decision makers’ marginal value of an additional
advisor improvement develops over time. Furthermore, we
modeled the ability to learn as a continual improvement
from estimation to estimation but actual machine learning
may also entail temporal performance losses. Therefore,
future research should examine the role of boundary con-
ditions in the effect of demonstrating the ability to learn,
such as the impact of estimation volatility and mistakes
during learning. Moreover, future research can explore
possible mediators explaining the effect (e.g., trusting
beliefs and expectation-confirmation) of the ability to learn
on user behavior. Constructs potentially influencing the
aforementioned effect as further moderators include user
(e.g., personality types or culture), system (e.g., usefulness
or transparency), and task (e.g., complexity or conse-
quentialness) characteristics. Third, our study used a task
of objective nature to study the relationship between
algorithm aversion and demonstrating an algorithm’s
ability to learn. Since previous research has shown algo-
rithm aversion to be more severe for tasks of a subjective
and personal nature than for tasks of an objective and non-
personal nature (Castelo et al. 2019; Longoni et al. 2019),
future research may investigate whether demonstrating an
algorithm’s ability to learn can also alleviate algorithm
aversion for subjective and personal tasks. Fourth, our
results support the reasoning that people exhibit algorithm
aversion for objective and non-personal tasks only if they
experience the algorithm to err. However, algorithms, like
humans, cannot provide perfect recommendations for
decisions under uncertainty. Future research may therefore
inspect people’s expectations of algorithms and the con-
ditions under which these expectations are disconfirmed.
9 Conclusion
Overall, our study is an initial step toward better under-
standing how users perceive the abilities of AI-based sys-
tems. Specifically, we shed light on how familiarity and
demonstrating the ability to learn affect users’ reliance on
algorithmic decision support. Our findings not only show
that familiarity with an erring algorithmic advisor reduces
decision makers’ reliance on this advisor but also that
demonstrating an algorithm’s ability to learn over time can
offset this effect. We hope that our study provides an
impetus for future research on collaboration with and
acceptance of AI-based systems as well as actionable rec-
ommendations for designing and unblackboxing such
systems.
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